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Comments

The Interplay of Pro Se Defendants, Standby
Counsel, and Ineffective Assistance of
Standby Counsel Claims: An Examination
of Current Law and a Suggestion for Reform
in Pennsylvania
Brittaney N. Eshbach*
ABSTRACT

Standby counsel is a term used to describe an attorney who has been
appointed by a court to advise and assist a pro se defendant. While a
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation, the
defendant does not have a constitutional right to standby counsel.
Instead, trial courts have the discretion to decide whether to appoint
standby counsel to aid a pro se defendant. Moreover, trial courts have
wide latitude in defining the precise role and responsibilities of an
attorney appointed to act as standby counsel. Pennsylvania Rule of
Criminal Procedure 121(D) and Pennsylvania courts' interpretations of
this section primarily govern the appointment of standby counsel. As a
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result of the flexibility of Pennsylvania law concerning standby counsel,
confusion abounds, and pro se defendants have frequently resorted to
raising ineffective assistance of standby counsel claims.
This Comment seeks to analyze the current state of the law
regarding pro se defendants, standby counsel, and ineffective assistance
of counsel claims by focusing on Pennsylvania case law. First, this
Comment discusses the relevant constitutional and statutory sources of
both United States and Pennsylvania law regarding the right to selfrepresentation, the role of standby counsel, and ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. Thereafter, this Comment analyzes the inconsistencies
and problems that exist in Pennsylvania as a result of the gaps in the
current law. Finally, this Comment calls for specific reform of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which would address much
of the confusion and inconsistency regarding the responsibilities of
standby counsel.
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INTRODUCTION

In courtroom A, a pro se defendant's trial for assault is about to
begin. The pro se defendant sits at the defense table and, next to him,
sits the attorney appointed to act as standby counsel. The standby
counsel's presence reassures the pro se defendant. The trial judge
informed the pro se defendant that his standby counsel may take an
active role in the trial by raising objections, suggesting legal arguments
to the pro se defendant, and, if the pro se defendant agrees, making
arguments to the court on his behalf.
In courtroom B, a second pro se defendant's trial for assault is about
to begin. Like the pro se defendant in courtroom A, this pro se defendant
and the attorney appointed to act as his standby counsel sit at the defense
table. However, the standby counsel's presence fails to calm this pro se
defendant's nerves. The trial judge has instructed standby counsel that
he may help the pro se defendant only with procedural matters and
general trial strategy. Thus, this pro se defendant truly feels like he is on
his own.
When looking at the two disparate situations described above, an
observer might reasonably assume that courtroom A and courtroom B are
located in different states or maybe even different countries. But that
Under current U.S. law and
assumption would be incorrect.
Pennsylvania law, courtroom A and courtroom B can legally coexist in
the same state, the same county, or even the same courthouse. The
coexistence of the aforementioned disparate courtrooms is both
problematic and unnerving.
Thus, this Comment analyzes the current state of the law regarding
pro se defendants, standby counsel, and ineffective assistance of counsel
claims by focusing on Pennsylvania case law. Part II of this Comment
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discusses the relevant constitutional and statutory sources of both U.S.
law and Pennsylvania law regarding the right to self-representation, the
role of standby counsel, and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
Thereafter, Part III of this Comment analyzes the inconsistencies and
problems that exist in Pennsylvania as a result of the gaps in the current
law in this area and calls for specific reform of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Finally, Part IV briefly summarizes the issues
discussed in this Comment.
II.

BACKGROUND

Criminal defendants' right to represent themselves and proceed pro
se at trial is protected by both federal constitutional and statutory law.'
However, the same cannot be said of the role of standby counsel because
the U.S. Constitution does not grant a right to standby counsel.2 Rather,
the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the trial court has the power to
appoint standby counsel to aid a pro se defendant and that the pro se
defendant has the right not to have standby counsel impermissibly
interfere with the defense the pro se defendant chooses to present to the
jury.,
A.

FederalLaw Addressing the Right to Self-Representationand the
Role of Standby Counsel
1.

Constitutional and Statutory Sources of Authority

The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution4 is the primary
source of the right to self-representation.
In relevant part, the Sixth
Amendment states, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 6 The U.S. Supreme
Court has interpreted the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to protect not only a defendant's right to have an attorney

1.

See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI; 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012) (guaranteeing parties

the right to represent themselves or be represented by counsel); Faretta v. California, 422

U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (holding that counsel may not be forced upon a defendant who
knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to assistance of counsel).
2. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183-84 (1984).
3. See infra Part II.A.2.b discussing McKaskle, 465 U.S. 168.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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represent the defendant in a criminal proceeding, but also a defendant's

right to represent himself or herself in a criminal proceeding.7
Perhaps even more importantly, since the beginning of our nation,
Congress has also protected the right to self-representation. The First
Congress codified this right in section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.9
The language used in the Judiciary Act of 1789 is very similar to the
language currently used in 28 U.S.C. § 1654,10 entitled "Appearance
personally or by counsel," which codifies the right to selfrepresentation." Section 1654 states that "[i]n all courts of the United
States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by
counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to
manage and conduct causes therein."1 2 This statute clarifies that a person
may represent himself or herself in federal court, which is implied by the
language of the Sixth Amendment.1 3
2.

U.S. Supreme Court Decisions

a.

Farettav. California

In Faretta v. California,14 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
criminal defendants in state court have the constitutional right to
represent themselves without counsel if they knowingly and voluntarily
choose to do so.'1 Initially, the trial judge in Faretta appointed a public
defender to represent the defendant on the charge of grand theft.16
Before the date of trial, the defendant asked to represent himself because
he thought the public defender's office was overworked.' 7 The trial
judge told the defendant that he would be held to the same standard as an
attorney and preliminarily ruled that the defendant effectively waived his
right to assistance of counsel.'
Thereafter, the trial judge held a second hearing to determine
whether the defendant was actually capable of handling his own
7. See infra Part II.A.2.a discussing Faretta,422 U.S. 806.
8. 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).
9. 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
14. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
15. Id. at 832-35.
16. Id. at 807.
17. See id. at 808 (noting that the defendant specifically asserted his belief that the
public defender's office was "very loaded down with ... a heavy case load").
18. Id. at 808 n.2 (noting that the trial judge told the defendant that he would have to
observe proper courtroom decorum and procedure even though the defendant might not
know the rules).

880

PENN STATE LAW REVIEw

[Vol. 121:3

defense.' 9 The trial judge asked the defendant about specific aspects of
trial procedure and state law. 2 0 Based on the defendant's answers, the
trial judge concluded that the defendant could not represent himself
because he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
assistance of counsel.2 1 The judge also ruled that the defendant did not
have a constitutional right to defend himself or act as co-counsel with his
reappointed public defender.22 At trial, the jury found the defendant
guilty. 2 3 Following several unsuccessful appeals in state court, the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari.24
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the right of self-representation is
firmly embedded in United States' history and that the right is implied by
the language of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 25 The
Court noted that the Sixth Amendment grants rights to the defendant
himself and not to the defendants' attorney.26 Therefore, the Court held
that the Sixth Amendment implicitly grants defendants the right to selfrepresentation. 27 The Court placed particular emphasis on the. word
"assistance," noting that, even though counsel may have expertise,
counsel is still only one of many tools that may be utilized by a
defendant. The Court further reasoned that counsel may not be forced
upon a defendant because such a mandate would violate the logic of the
Sixth Amendment.2 9
The Court also made clear, that defendants who represents
themselves, and thus proceed pro se, must do so "knowingly and
intelligently" because a pro se defendant gives up the many benefits
associated with representation by an attorney.30 Moreover, the Court
stated that judges should ensure that a defendant is aware of the risks
associated with self-representation.3 1 The Court further stated that
defendants who proceed pro se may not argue on appeal that they were

19. Id. at 808.
20. See id. at 808 n.3.
21. Id. at 809-10.
22. Id.at810-11.
23. Id. at 811.
24. Faretta,422 U.S. at 812.
25. Id. at 812-14.
26. Id at 819.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 820.
29. Id. (reasoning that the Sixth Amendment requires a defendant to specifically
choose whether to hand his case over to a lawyer, and if the defendant does not agree to
representation, then the defense presented by the lawyer is not really the defense the
defendant wanted to present).

30.
31.

Id. at 835.
Id.

2017]

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF STANDBY COUNSEL CLAIMS

881

denied effective assistance of counsel because the quality of their pro se
defense was inadequate.32
Regarding the notion of "standby counsel," the Court noted that "a
State may-even over objection by the accused-appoint 'standby
counsel' to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to
be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the
defendant's self-representation is necessary." 33 The Court implied that
the appointment of standby counsel may be necessary to ensure that the
defendant respects the court and complies with the requirements of both
procedural and substantive law.3 4 However, while the Court made clear
that pro se defendants may not later claim that their own defense was
ineffective, the Court remained silent on whether pro se defendants may
later claim that standby counsel was ineffective. 3
b.

McKaskle v. Wiggins

Less than ten years after the Court decided Faretta, in McKaskle v.
Wiggins,3 6 the Court addressed what actions standby counsel may take
during trial when a defendant has objected to the presence of the standby
counsel.37 The Court held that, when determining whether a defendant's
Farettarights have been violated, a court should focus on whether the
defendant was able to present the case in his or her way.38 The Court
laid out a lengthy framework for conducting this analysis.3 9
In McKaskle, the state charged the defendant with robbery. 40 At his
first trial, the defendant filed a motion to proceed pro se. 41 The trial
judge granted the defendant's motion, but exercised judicial discretion by
appointing two attorneys to jointly act as standby counsel.4 2 The
defendant initially objected to the participation of his standby counsel,
but the defendant later accepted the attorneys' presence and instructed
them to raise objections directly to the court on his behalf.4 3 Following

32. Id. at 834 n.46.
33. Id. (citing United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124-26 (D.C. Cir. 1972))
(holding that the right to proceed pro se, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1654, may not be denied
on the basis of potential disruption alone, but noting that, if the defendant is deliberately
disruptive and unruly, then the right to proceed pro se might be waived).
34. See Faretta,422 U.S. at 834 n.46.
35. Id.
36. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
37. Id. at 170.
38. Id. at 177.
39. See id. at 176-84.
40. Id. at 170.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 170-71.
43. Id. at 171.
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conviction by a jury, the judge granted a new trial because the original
indictment was faulty."
Initially, the defendant wanted to be represented at his second trial,
but, just a few days before trial, the defendant told the court that he again
wanted to proceed pro se.4 5 The court acquiesced, but required that
standby counsel remain in the courtroom for consultation.46 Throughout
the course of the second trial, the defendant consulted with standby
counsel.47 The second jury also found the defendant guilty. 48 The
defendant subsequently appealed and argued that standby counsel had
"unfairly interfered with his presentation of his defense." 4 9 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant's right to
self-representation was violated by the participation of standby counsel
and stated that "standby counsel is 'to be seen, but not heard."'5 0 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and expressly rejected the "seen, but
not heard" rule announced by the Fifth Circuit.
In McKaskle, the Supreme Court began by noting that the Faretta
Court not only recognized a constitutional right to self-representation,
but also held that "a trial court may appoint 'standby counsel' to assist
the pro se defendant in his defense."5 2 Thereafter, the McKaskle Court
acknowledged the importance of allowing a pro se defendant to address
the court and jury, control the order and substance of his own defense,
make motions and legal arguments, and question witnesses. 3 However,
the Court reasoned that Faretta does not mandate an "absolute bar on
standby counsel's unsolicited participation." 54 Instead, the Court
announced a broad standard that focuses "on whether the defendant had a
fair chance to present his case in his own way." 55 To help meet that
standard, the Court placed two main limitations on standby counsel by
stating that a pro se defendant is entitled to (1) actual control over the

44. Id.
45. Id. at 171-72.
46. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 172.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 173.
49. Id
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id at 170. The McKaskle Court's announcement that the Faretta Court held that
a trial court may appoint "standby counsel" is significant because this language did not
appear in the text of the Farettadecision, but rather appeared in footnote 46. See Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975).
53. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 174.
54. Id. at 176.
55. Id at 177.
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case presented to the jury and (2) perceived control of the case while in
the presence of the jury.5
With respect to the "actual control" limitation, the Court noted
specifically that standby counsel may not "substantially interfere with
any significant tactical decisions," control witness questioning, or speak
instead of the defendant on critical issues. 57 Regarding the "perceived
control" limitation, the Court noted that the jury must know that the
defendant is representing himself.58 To fulfill the "perceived control"
requirement, the Court reasoned that disagreements between the pro se
defendant and standby counsel should be decided in favor of the
defendant if the issue is ordinarily one left to the discretion of counsel.59
The Court further reasoned that the actions of standby counsel are
unlikely to be objectionable if the pro se defendant expressly approves of
or acquiesces to the conduct.6 0 Then, the Court clarified that, once a pro
se defendant acquiesces to participation by standby counsel, the standby
counsel's participation in the case will be seen as unobjectionable unless
the defendant expressly asks for standby counsel to cease active
participation in the case. 6 ' The Court further determined that standby
counsel is always permitted to aid the pro se defendant with ordinary
procedural and evidentiary matters and specific tasks requested by the
defendant.62
Although the McKaskle Court eventually concluded that many of
the actions of the defendant's standby counsel were "irreproachable," the
Court also noted that "standby counsel's participation at [the
defendant's] trial should not serve as a model for future trials."63 The
Court reached this conclusion based on an evaluation of the defendant's
participation at trial and standby counsel's participation at trial.64
In particular, the McKaskle Court approved the pro se defendant's
direct participation in major aspects of the trial, including jury selection,
opening and closing statements, direct and cross-examination of
witnesses, and raising objections.65 The Court, however, disapproved of
the fact that standby counsel infrequently interrupted the defendant,
56. Id. at 178.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 179.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 182.
61. Id at 183.
62. Id at 183-84.
63. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 185-86 (implying that standby counsel was too involved
when he or she relayed information about witnesses to the court, aided the defendant with
evidentiary procedure, supplied the defendant with forms, questioned some witnesses,
and instructed the defendant not to argue legal points while a witness was on the stand).
64. Id. at 184-87.
65. Id. at 184-86.
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made unsolicited comments, and occasionally used profanity.66 The
Court also considered the agreement between standby counsel and the
defendant, which permitted standby counsel to give a closing argument,
and the fact that the trial court consistently ruled against standby counsel
when the pro se defendant and standby counsel disagreed in the presence
of the jury.67 Thus, the Court concluded that, although standby counsel's
actions were not praiseworthy, they did not infringe on the defendant's
Farettarights.68
In sum, the McKaskle Court determined that, although standby
counsel need not remain silent, standby counsel must respect the
defendant's constitutional rights to proceed pro se and present the
defense in the defendant's own preferred way.69
PennsylvaniaLaw Addressing the Right to Self-Representation and
the Role of Standby Counsel

B.

While Pennsylvania obviously must comply with the U.S.
Constitution and U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding a criminal
defendant's rights, federal law merely provides the minimum required
771
protection.7 0 States are free to expand upon those minimum guarantees.7
In Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Constitution also protects a
defendant's right to self-representation. 72 . Additionally, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, with the guidance of the Criminal Procedural
Rules Committee, has addressed the role of standby counsel in the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.7 ' Aside from federal law,
standby counsel's role in Pennsylvania is guided by the Pennsylvania
Constitution, the language of Pennsylvania's standby counsel rule, and
interpretations of the rule by state court judges.74
Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 75 is similar to
the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.76 Among other rights,
66. Id. at 185-86.
67. Id. at 186-87.
68. Id. at 186.
69. Id. at 187-88.
70. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and
Independent State Grounds as a Means ofBalancing the Relationship Between State and
Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 980 (1985) (discussing the notion that states are
free to build upon the foundation of rights created by the federal constitution).
71. Pollock, supra note 70, at 980.

§ 9.

72.

PA. CONST. art. I,

73.

PA. R. CRIM. P. 121(D); see also Criminal Procedural Rules Committee,

UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYS. OF PA., http://www.pacourts.us/courts/supreme-court/committees/

rules-committees/criminal-procedural-rules-committee (last visited Jan. 16, 2017)
(describing the purpose of the Criminal Procedural Rules Committee).
74. PA. CONST. art I, § 9; PA. R. CRIM. P. 121(D); PA. R. CRIM. P. 121 cmt.
75. PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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'

Article I, Section 9 provides that a defendant in a criminal proceeding
has "the right to be heard by himself and his counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." 77 Thus, like the Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees a defendant's right to
representation by an attorney or self-representation.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, with the guidance of
the Criminal Procedural Rules Committee, has incorporated the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in McKaskle v. Wiggins into the Pennsylvania
Rules of Criminal Procedure.7 9 However, in contrast to the Supreme
Court's lengthy and detailed decision in McKaskle, Pennsylvania's rule
concerning the role of standby counsel in criminal proceedings consists
of two very short sentences.so Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure
121(D) ("Rule 121(D)") states, "[w]hen the defendant's waiver of
counsel is accepted, standby counsel may be appointed for the defendant.
Standby counsel shall attend the proceedings and shall be available to the
defendant for consultation and advice." 8
The official comment to Rule 121(D) provides more guidance
regarding when a trial judge should appoint standby counsel.82 The
comment specifically notes that appointment of standby counsel is
prudent when the case may be long and complicated or involves multiple
defendants or disruptive defendants who may lose the right to selfrepresentation if their behavior becomes unruly. 83 Beyond this limited
guidance, Pennsylvania trial judges must-exercise -discretion- in-orderto
explain the rights and duties of the pro se defendant and the attorney
appointed as standby counsel. The exercise of discretion inevitably leads
to varied instructions and confusion amongst all participants in the
proceedings.
C.

FederalStandardRegardingIneffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims

Generally, defendants may raise a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel on appeal whenever their lawyer fails to provide effective legal

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

CompareU.S. CoNST. amend. VI, with PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
Id.
See PA. R. CRIM. P. 12 1(D).
Id.
Id.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 12 1(D) cmt.
Id.
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assistance to them.8 4 However, defendants who choose to represent
themselves may not later claim that the quality of their own defense was
ineffective.
In Strickland v. Washington,86 the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated
that "the [Sixth Amendment's] right to counsel is the right to the
effective assistance of counsel." 87 The Court stated that the core of
ineffectiveness is whether the attorney's conduct was so egregious that
the decision reached at the trial court is unreliable and unjust.8 8 The
Court then announced a two-part test for determining whether a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable.8 9 The Court held that, in
order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant
must show that: (1) the defendant's attorney's performance during the
trial was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the
defendant. 90
Thereafter, the Strickland Court elaborated on the meaning of each
prong of the test.9 1 Regarding the performance prong, the Court
reasoned that the standard for judging the attorney's performance is
objective and based on professional norms.92 The question is whether
the actions and decisions of the attorney fall within the range of actions
and decisions that a reasonable attorney would take. 93 The attorney must
remain loyal to the client and must utilize the attorney's specialized skill
and knowledge.94 Additionally, the Court found that the reasonableness
of the attorney's decisions must be judged under the totality of the
circumstances at the time the decisions were made.95
Regarding the prejudice prong, the Strickland Court noted that
96
However, the
courts may presume prejudice in limited situations.
Court held that, in most situations, the defendant must prove prejudice by
showing that the errors committed by his or her attorney were so

.

84. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (discussing
ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
85. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975).
86. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
87. Id. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)).
88. Id.
89. Id at 687.
90. Id.
91. Id at 687-98.
92. Id. at 688.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 690.
96. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (noting specifically that prejudice may be presumed
where the defendant was actually or constructively denied assistance of counsel or where
counsel has an actual conflict of interest).
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grievous that the defendant was denied a fair trial. 9 7 In other words,
"[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different." 98 To determine whether the outcome would have
been different, a court must consider all of the evidence presented during
the original trial. 99 As justification for this standard, the Court noted that
the purpose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is to attack the
fundamental fairness of the defendant's conviction. 100
D.

Pennsylvania StandardRegardingIneffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court directly addressed the
applicability of Strickland in Commonwealth v. Pierce.01 In Pierce, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court compared its standard for judging
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, which was announced in
Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney,1 02 with the new standard
set forth in Strickland.10 3
Initially, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that its
ineffective assistance of counsel cases have consistently required
consideration of two elements when the defendant's claim is of arguable
merit: (1) whether counsel's performance was unreasonable and (2)
whether defendant was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance.1 04
Thereafter, citing "obvious textual and policy considerations[,]" the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that Maroney and Strickland
"constitute the same rule."os The Pennsylvania Supreme Court further
explained that the Maroney standard provides equivalent protection to
the federal Stricklandstandard.1 06
More recently, in Commonwealth v. Lambert,1 07 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court articulated its ineffective assistance of counsel standard
as having three distinct elements: (1) an underlying claim of arguable
merit, (2) unreasonable performance by counsel, and (3) a reasonable
probability that the outcome would have been different had counsel been

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 687.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 697.
Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987).
Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 235 A.2d 349 (Pa. 1967).
Pierce, 527 A.2d at 973.
Id. at 975.
Id. at 976.
Id.
Commonwealth v. Lambert, 797 A.2d 232 (Pa. 2001).
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effective.108 It is worth noting, however, that the three-pronged test in
Lambert is simply a repackaging of the two-pronged test previously
articulated in Maroney.

III. ANALYSIS
A.

DisparityAmong Pennsylvania Courts Regardingthe Duties and
Responsibilities of Standby Counsel

The above-described framework is extremely flexible and allows
judges to exercise practically unfettered discretion about whether to
appoint standby counsel and what duties and responsibilities appointed
standby counsel may perform.1 09 In Pennsylvania, courts in different
counties have reached disparate conclusions regarding how active
standby counsel should be during a trial conducted by a pro se defendant.
Judges in some counties instruct standby counsel to be very active, 110
while judges in other counties narrowly describe what actions standby
counsel may undertake."'
1.

Commonwealth v. Africa

In Commonwealth v. Africa,1 12 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
passing, addressed.the role of standby counsel for the first time since the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Faretta.'13 Africa originated in the
Municipal Court of Philadelphia County,11 4 where the trial judge granted
the defendants' motion to proceed pro se. 1"
However, the judge
exercised his discretion and appointed a public defender to act as the
108. Id. at 243 (citing Commonwealth v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326, 333 (Pa. 1999)).
See also Commonwealth v. Bryant, 855 A.2d 726, 735-36 (Pa. 2004); Commonwealth v.
Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
109. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63 (Pa. 2012); Commonwealth v.
Fletcher, 896 A.2d 508 (Pa. 2006); Commonwealth v. Brazil, 701 A.2d 216 (Pa. 1997);
Commonwealth v. Africa, 353 A.2d 855 (Pa. 1976).
110. See, e.g., Brazil, 701 A.2d 216 (originating in the Court of Common Pleas of
Montgomery County); Africa, 353 A.2d 855 (originating in the Municipal Court of
Philadelphia County).
111. See, e.g., Spotz, 47 A.3d 63 (originating in the Court of Common Pleas of York
County); Fletcher, 896 A.2d 508 (originating in the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County).
112. Commonwealth v. Africa, 353 A.2d 855 (Pa. 1976).
113. Id. at 863-64.
114. Id. at 862 n.3. The Municipal Court of Philadelphia has limited jurisdiction and
is responsible for trying criminal offenses punishable by five years incarceration or less,
civil cases where the amount in controversy is less than $12,000, landlord and tenant
cases, and real estate and school tax cases under $15,000. For more information on the
Municipal
Court of Philadelphia,
see Municipal Court, PHILA. CTS.,
http://courts.phila.gov/municipal/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
115. Africa, 353 A.2d at 858.
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'

defendants' "legal advisor."'1 6 Throughout the trial, the defendants
repeatedly engaged in disruptive outbursts and the judge ordered them
"bound and gagged" several times.11 7 As a result of the repeated
disruptions, the judge declared a mistrial, held the defendants in
contempt of court and, thereafter, sentenced them to serve varying jail
terms.1
Following the mistrial, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court assumed
jurisdiction of the case by a per curiam grant of supersedeas.1 9 While
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was primarily concerned with the
defendants' sentences for contempt, 12 0 the court also addressed the role
of standby counsel.121 The court first noted that disruptions in the
courtroom cannot be tolerated because they threaten the functionality of
the court. 122 In spite of this proclamation, the court maintained that
"[p]otentially disruptive defendants [ ... ] have the right to represent
themselves if counsel is validly waived." 23 However, the court also
recognized that courts should appoint standby counsel in such
situations. 12 4 The court noted that standby counsel should be available
"to perform all the services a trained advocate would perform." 2 5
Africa illustrates two of the different roles that standby counsel has
occupied in Pennsylvania cases. First, the trial court appointed the
public defender to act as "legal advisor" to the defendants,1 26 a title that
connotes a more technical role. Although the- court did not expound
upon the meaning of "legal advisor," an attorney occupying this role
116. Id. Notably, courts, practitioners, and scholars have used many different terms
to describe what is now commonly called "standby counsel." For a discussion of other
commonly used terms, see Jona Goldschmidt, Judging the Effectiveness of Standby
Counsel: Are They Phone Psychics? Theatrical Understudies? Or Both?, 24 S. CAL.
REv. L. & Soc. JUST. 133, 150-54 (2015).
117. Africa, 353 A.2d at 858-61 (explaining, among other things, that the defendants
used profanity and abusive language, laid on the floor, shouted at spectators, and
demanded that if one of them was to be bound and gagged, then they all should be bound
and gagged).
118. Id. at 861 (describing the specific contemptuous acts of each defendant).
119. Id. at 862. A supersedeas is "[a] writ or bond that suspends a judgment
creditor's power to levy execution, usu[ally] pending appeal." Supersedeas, BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Supersedeas, THE FREE DICTIONARY,
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Supersedeas (last visited Feb. 14, 2017)
(defining a supersedeas as "a process designed to stop enforcement of a trial court
judgment brought up for review").
120. Africa, 353 A.2d at 858-62, 865-67.
121. Id. at 864.
122. Id. at 863.
123. Id. at 864.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 864 n.18 (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 468 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., concurring)).
126. Id at 858.
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would likely be tasked with advising the defendant about applicable law
and legal procedures, but not with actively participating in the trial via
making objections or examining witnesses.
Second, the passing
guidance of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court seems to indicate that an
attorney appointed as standby counsel must utilize his formal training
and actively participate in the trial whenever the defendant seriously
misbehaves. 127 Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued this
guidance without referencing the language of Rule 121(D) and did not
explain the meaning of the Court's reference to the phrase "perform all
the services a trained advocate would perform" because the role of
standby counsel was only a tangential issue in Africa.'28
2.

Commonwealth v. Brazil

In Commonwealth v. Brazil,129 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
specifically addressed several aspects of what is now Rule 121(D). 130
Brazil originated in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
and involved an incident between inmates and guards at the State
Correctional Institute at Graterford.13 ' During the preliminary hearing, a
public defender represented the defendant. 132 However, the defendant
told the judge that he wanted to represent himself during his trial.133
Without conducting a waiver of counsel colloquy, 134 the judge allowed
127. Id. at 864 n.18 (quoting Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 468 (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
128. Id.
129. Commonwealth v. Brazil, 701 A.2d 216 (Pa. 1997).
130. Id. at 218-19. At the time this case was tried, the standby counsel provision was
codified in the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 318. Rule 318 was
renumbered Rule 121 on March 1, 2000. PA. R. CRIM. P. 121 note (effective Apr. 1,
2001).
131. Brazil, 701 A.2d at 217.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. PA. R. CRIM. P. 121(A)(2) provides:
To ensure that the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent, the judge or issuing authority, at a minimum, shall
elicit the following information from the defendant:
(a) that the defendant understands that he or she has the right to be
represented by counsel, and the right to have free counsel appointed if the
defendant is indigent;
(b) that the defendant understands the nature of the charges against the
defendant and the elements of each of those charges;
(c) that the defendant is aware of the permissible range of sentences and/or
fines for the offenses charged;
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the defendant to represent himself and placed the public defender from
the defendant's preliminary hearing on "standby" status.135 At trial, the
judge allowed the defendant's standby counsel to present a closing
argument to the jury and discuss jury instructions with the court.1 36 The
defendant also consulted with standby counsel on three separate
37
occasions during the cross-examination of several witnesses.1
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed both the
waiver of counsel and the standby counsel issues.13 8 The Court first
quoted the criminal procedure rules regarding waiver of counsel and
139
standby counsel, including the language now codified in Rule 121(D).
The core of the Court's opinion centered on the separate and distinct
requirement that a trial judge must conduct a full waiver of counsel
colloquy with a defendant every time a defendant seeks to represent
himself, regardless of whether standby counsel is appointed.1 40
Moreover, the court made clear that the appointment of standby counsel
is not a substitute for a waiver of counsel colloquy.141
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's conclusion in Brazil
demonstrates that the role of standby counsel is not pervasive enough to
adequately protect all of the defendant's rights. 142 The Court's reasoning
implies that standby counsel is not fully engaged in every aspect of the
proceedings and, thus, that standby counsel is not responsible for
scrupulously protecting every right the defendant possesses.

(d) that the defendant understands that if he or she waives the right to
counsel, the defendant will still be bound by all the normal rules of
procedure and that counsel would be familiar with these rules;
(e) that the defendant understands that there are possible defenses to these
charges that counsel might be aware of, and if these defenses are not
raised at trial, they may be lost permanently; and
(f) that the defendant understands that, in addition to defenses, the
defendant has many rights that, if not timely asserted, may be lost
permanently; and that if errors occur and are not timely objected to, or
otherwise timely raised by the defendant, these errors may be lost
permanently.
Id.
135. Brazil, 701 A.2d at 217.
136. Id. at 217 n.1.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 218.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 218-19.
141. Id. at 219.
142. See id at 219 (explaining that the presence of standby counsel is not enough to
negate the requirement that a trial court conduct a waiver of counsel colloquy when a
defendant chooses to proceed pro se).
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Moreover, the Montgomery County judge in Brazil allowed standby
counsel to play a more active role at the pro se defendant's trial than the
Philadelphia Municipal Court judge in Africa instructed standby counsel
to play. Specifically, the Montgomery County judge in Brazil allowed
standby counsel to speak directly to the jury and the court on behalf of
the defendant.1 43 These actions seemingly contradict the U.S. Supreme
Court's holding in McKaskle that a pro se defendant must be able to
retain actual and perceived control of his or her case. 14 4 Arguably, by
hearing standby counsel give a closing argument, the jury in Brazil could
have easily believed that the defendant was represented by or, at the very
least, was acting as co-counsel with his standby counsel.
3.

Commonwealth v. Fletcher

In Commonwealth v. Fletcher,14 5 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reviewed the award of a new trial to the defendant by a post-conviction
court.1 4 6 While the substance of this case is largely irrelevant, 147 the
portions of this opinion detailing the appointment of standby counsel are
germane to the discussion at hand. Fletcher originated in the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.1 4 8 On appeal, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court noted, but did not comment on, the appointment of
standby counsel by the trial judge. 149
After the jury found the defendant guilty, the defendant filed a
motion to dismiss his court-appointed attorney and proceed pro se for his
post-verdict claims.so The trial court conducted a waiver of counsel
colloquy, granted the defendant's motion, and appointed the defendant's
former attorney as standby counsel.'1 5
Thereafter, the trial court
specifically delineated the role of standby counsel and the
responsibilities of the defendant. 5 2 The trial court stated that standby
counsel may direct the pro se defendant "in every way he knows how
concerning his claim, the pertinent legal principles and the pertinent
.

143. Id.at2l7n.1..
144. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984).
145. Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 896 A.2d 508 (Pa. 2006).
146. Id. at 509.
147. Id. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania challenged a post-conviction court's
grant of a new trial to the defendant, who had been convicted of first-degree murder. Id.
The post-conviction court granted the new trial because the assistant medical examiner,
who had performed the autopsy of the murder victim, did not testify at defendant's
original trial. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.at512-13.
150. Id. at 512.
151. Id. at 513.
152. Id.
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procedure relevant in this case . . . .""' However, the defendant was

responsible for filing the post-verdict motions and presenting oral
argument to the court. 1 54 The trial court also confirmed that the
defendant understood that he was on his own and that if he "goofed," he
could not later claim ineffective assistance of counsel.155
The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in Fletcher
delineated yet another variation of what the proper role of standby
counsel can be. In contrast to the Court of Common Pleas of
Montgomery County in Brazil and the Philadelphia Municipal Court in
Africa, which did not specifically speak to the responsibilities of both
standby counsel and the pro se defendant, the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County in Fletcher spoke of the separate responsibilities of
both standby counsel and the pro se defendant.' 6 Implicitly, the
Fletcher court addressed the separate responsibilities of standby counsel
and the pro se defendant for the dual purposes of ensuring that: (1) the
defendant truly understood the ramifications of his decision and (2) the
attorney understood his role was limited.157 Arguably, this approach
creates a clear framework for the standby counsel-pro se defendant
relationship.
4.

Commonwealth v. Spotz

In Commonwealth v.

Spotz, 5 8

the

defendant

petitioned the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to review his petition for collateral relief
under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)1 5 9 following his firstdegree murder conviction in York County.1 60 The defendant raised many
arguments in his petition, including that the trial court improperly
restricted the two lawyers appointed to act as his standby counsel.' 6 ' The
defendant argued that the limitations were so severe as to render the
appointment of standby counsel meaningless.1 62 At trial, the judge stated
that standby counsel could advise the defendant of legal matters that
came up during the trial and help with exhibit procedure. 6 3 However,
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Fletcher, 896 A.2d at 512-13.
156. Compare Commonwealth v. Brazil, 701 A.2d 216, 218-19 (Pa. 1997), and
Commonwealth v. Africa, 353 A.2d 855, 864 (Pa. 1976), with Fletcher, 896 A.2d at 51213.
157. Fletcher, 896 A.2d at 512-13.
158. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63 (2012).
159. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9541-9546 (2016).
160. Spotz, 47 A.3d at 73.
161. Id. at 76.
162. Id. at 81.
163. Id. at 81-82.
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the judge further explained that standby counsel could not take notes,
instigate communication with the defendant, offer arguments for the
defendant, or make suggestions about what to do next or when to make
an objection. 164 The judge also explained to the defendant that standby
counsel could not "sit there and go over stuff with [the defendant] as if
they are really counsel but [the defendant is] asking the questions."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
PCRA court, which held that the trial court properly instructed standby
counsel and that even with the aforementioned restrictions in place, the
defendant's standby counsel offered aid when asked, provided the
defendant with documents, and discussed general trial strategy.1 66 In its
affirmation of the PCRA court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated
that there was no merit to the defendant's claim and that the trial judge
impermissibly exercised his discretion in restricting the role of standby
counsel. 167
The highly restricted role of standby counsel delineated by the
Court of Common Pleas of York County in Spotz is still another variation
of what the role of standby counsel can be. In contrast to the Court of
Common Pleas of Montgomery County in Brazil, which allowed standby
counsel to play an active role in the defendant's trial, the Court of
Common Pleas of York County in Spotz narrowly defined the scope of
standby counsel's actions.168 The main difference between these two
approaches is that, in Brazil, standby counsel was permitted to speak
directly to the jury on behalf of the defendant, while in Spotz, standby
counsel was limited to a behind the scenes role. 169 Arguably, the
approach taken in Spotz is truer to the description of standby counsel
currently contained in Rule 121(D) because the standby counsel in Spotz
played a supporting role, while the defendant took the lead.
B.

Nonrecognition of an "Ineffective Assistance of Standby Counsel"
Claim in Pennsylvania

In addition to giving standby counsel different responsibilities and
restrictions, Pennsylvania courts and federal courts have also consistently
refused to allow pro se defendants to raise ineffective assistance of

164. Id.
165. Id. at 81.
166. Id. at 82.
167. Id.
168. Compare Commonwealth v. Brazil, 701 A.2d 216, 217 n.1 (Pa. 1997), with
Spotz, 47 A.3d at 81-82.
169. Compare Brazil, 701 A.2d at 217 n.1, with Spotz, 47 A.3d at 81-82.
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standby counsel claims.17 0 Despite the myriad cases espoising that an
ineffective assistance of standby counsel claim is without merit, pro se
defendants continue to raise the claim. 17 1
1.
Early Decisions in Pennsylvania Refusing to Recognize
Ineffectiveness of Standby Counsel
Commonwealth v. Glessnerl72 was one of the first cases in
Pennsylvania to stand for the proposition that a pro se defendant cannot
claim ineffective assistance of standby counsel.1 73 In a short paragraph,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court reasoned that such a claim does not
exist because a pro se defendant cannot shift the responsibility of his own
ineffectiveness to the standby counsel who was acting in an advisory
role. 174
In the early 2000s, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expanded on
and ratified the holding of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Glessner.
In 2004, in Commonwealth v. Bryant, 75 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
stated that it would categorically refuse to consider "any ineffectiveness
claims that arise from the period of self-representation."'7 6 Two years
later, in Commonwealth v. Fletcher,'77 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
applied and clarified Bryant by stating that ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims are precluded when the defendant chooses to represent
himself. 171
2. Federal Courts in Pennsylvania Agree with the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court
Three years after Fletcher, in United States v. Tilley,1 7 9 a case that
originated from the Western District of Pennsylvania, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that there is no constitutional
170. See, e.g., United States v. Tilley, 326 F. App'x 96 (3d Cir. 2009); Blackman v.
McGrady, No. 12-5160, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184934 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2013); Miller
v. Lamas, No. 10-293, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30486 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2012);
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739 (Pa. 2014); Spotz, 47 A.3d 63;
Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 896 A.2d 508 (Pa. 2006); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 855
A.2d 726 (Pa. 2004); Commonwealth v. Glessner, 486 A.2d 521 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
171. See, e.g., Fletcher, 896 A.2d 508; Bryant, 855 A.2d 726; Glessner, 486 A.2d
521.
172. Commonwealth v. Glessner, 486 A.2d 521 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
173. Id. at 524-25.
174. Id.
175. Commonwealth v. Bryant, 855 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2004).
176. Id. at 737.
177. Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 896 A.2d 508 (Pa. 2006).
178. Id.at522.
179. United States v. Tilley, 326 F. App'x 96 (3d Cir. 2009).
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right to have standby counsel raise objections on behalf of the
defendant.o The Tilley court reasoned that, even if standby counsel
could give ineffective assistance, standby counsel would not be obligated
to object to testimony solicited by the defendant because that would
violate the defendant's right to control his own defense under
McKaskle.'"' The Tilley court further stated that a pro se defendant
cannot claim that his self-representation amounted to ineffective
assistance of counsel. 182 This statement about ineffectiveness claims
slightly narrowed the categorical approach taken in Bryant.18 3 However,
Tilley signaled, for the first time, that the federal courts in Pennsylvania
were willing to embrace the reasoning articulated by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.
A few years later, in Miller v. Lamas (Miller 1),184 a magistrate
judge for the United States. District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania recommended that the defendant's writ of habeas corpus
petition be denied as meritless because a pro se defendant cannot claim
that his standby counsel was ineffective.'" The magistrate judge cited
the language of Rule 121(D) and reasoned that a pro se defendant cannot
"bootstrap his own failure to raise [a] claim by blaming [standby]
counsel for failing to remedy his own mistake."' 8 6 The district judge
adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation in Miller v.
Lamas (Miller 11)187, signifying approval of the magistrate judge's
reasoning.

188

Most recently, in the 2013 decision in Blackman v. McGrady,8 9 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
reiterated that a. defendant who chooses self-representation cannot later
claim ineffective assistance of counsel.1 90 The McGrady court reasoned
that "the right to counsel and the right to self-representation are mutually

180. Id. at 96.
18 1. Id.
182. Id.
183. Commonwealth v. Bryant, 855 A.2d 726, 737 (Pa. 2004) (stating that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would categorically refise to consider "any ineffectiveness
claims that arise from the period of self-representation").
184. Miller v. Lamas, No. 10-293, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30486 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 15,
2012).
185. Id. at *23, *20 n.7.
186. Id. at *20 n.7 (quoting Bryant, 855 A.2d at 740).
187. Miller v. Lamas, No. 10-293, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30361 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 7,
2012).
188. Id. at *2.
189. Blackman v. McGrady, No. 12-5160, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184934 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 26, 2013).
190. Id. at *32 (citing Commonwealth v. Sims, 549 A.2d 1280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
and Bryant, 855 A.2d at 737).
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To bolster this proposition, the McGrady court heavily

relied on the Bryant court's proposition that claims of ineffective standby
counsel are precluded when defendants choose to represent
themselves. 192
The McGrady court noted that, logically, a defendant "cannot waive
his right to counsel, and [then] later complain that the counsel he
received was ineffective.", 19 3
The McGrady court reasoned that
ineffective assistance of standby counsel claims fail because such claims
exist only if a right is violated, and, under McKaskle, no constitutional
right to standby counsel exists. 194 Moreover, the McGrady court
reasoned that a pro se defendant simply cannot have it both ways because
no constitutional right to "hybrid representation" exists.'9 5 Additionally,
the McGrady court reasoned that the main concern envisioned by
McKaskle is that standby counsel does too much, so as to take control
away from the pro se defendant.1 9 6 Thus, the McGrady court reasoned
that it was rational for the Pennsylvania state courts to reject the
defendant's claim because the defendant argued that standby counsel did
too little.19
3.
Recent Decisions in Pennsylvania Refusing to Recognize
Ineffectiveness of Standby Counsel
Contemporaneous with the McGrady decision in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania were two
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions that expounded upon the refusal
to recognize ineffective assistance of standby counsel claims brought by
pro se defendants.' 9 8 These two cases clearly show that Pennsylvania
courts have not shied away from this line of reasoning, but rather have
embraced such rationale.
In 2012, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court thoroughly discussed the
topic of standby counsel in Commonwealth v. Spotz.1 99 The first part of
191. Id. at *33.
192. Id. at *34.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at *34-35 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 410 A.2d 880, 883 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1979) for the proposition that neither the U.S. Constitution nor the Pennsylvania
Constitution recognize a right to hybrid representation). Hybrid representation occurs
where a lawyer acts as co-counsel with a defendant. See Hybrid Representation,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).

196. McGrady, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184934 at *36.
197. Id. at *43.
198. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63 (Pa. 2012); Commonwealth v.
Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739 (Pa. 2014).
199. See Spotz, 47 A.3d at 81-83.
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the Spotz decision discussed the role of standby counsel. 2 00 However, the
second part of the Spotz decision held that there was no merit to the
defendant's claim that standby counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the limitations that the trial judge imposed on standby
counsel. 2 0 1 The Spotz court stated that the defendant's claim was
meritless because the trial court judge acted within the confines of his
discretionary power. 202
In part, the Spotz court based its decision on the fact that, when a
defendant chooses self-representation, the defendant alone is the counsel
of record for the case.203 Moreover, the Spotz court reasoned that
allowing a pro se defendant to raise ineffectiveness claims would
"mak[e] a mockery of the judicial system." 20 4 Finally, the Spotz court
stated that the court would not hear an ineffective assistance of standby
counsel claim based on lack of action by standby counsel during a trial in
which the defendant chose self-representation.205
Two years later, in Commonwealth v. Blakeney,2 06 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court succinctly summarized all of the prior holdings
concerning what claims may be raised by a pro se defendant.2 07 The
Blakeney court held that a pro se defendant cannot claim that he was
ineffective or that his standby counsel was ineffective.208 Moreover, the
Blakeney court reiterated that a defendant cannot claim standby counsel
did too little because the role of standby counsel must be limited in order
to safeguard the defendant's Faretta rights. 20 9 Finally, the Blakeney
court held that no right to "hybrid" representation or "co-counsel" status
exists because, per Rule 121(D), the sole purpose of standby counsel is to
be available to the defendant for consultation and advice. 2 10 Thus, the
Blakeney court proclaimed that standby counsel cannot be subject to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims because of the limited role
envisioned by Rule 12 1(D). 211

200.
2012).
201.
202.
203.
204.
2004)).
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

See supra Part III.A.4 discussing Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63 (Pa.
Spotz, 47 A.3d at 82.
Id.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 96 n.25. (citing Commonwealth v. Bryant, 855 A.2d 726, 736-37 (Pa.
Id. at 95-96.
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739 (Pa. 2014).
Id. at 748-49.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 756.
Id. at 762.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63, 82-83 (Pa. 2012)).
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Problems with the CurrentState ofPennsylvania Law Regarding
Pro Se Defendants, Standby Counsel, andIneffective Assistance of
Counsel Claims

Against the aforementioned backdrop, the intersection of the right
to self-representation, the role of standby counsel, and ineffective
assistance of counsel claims is clearly complicated and problematic. In
Pennsylvania, Rule 121(D), more than any other source of law, is at the
crux of this intersection. Rule 121(D) largely contributes to some of the
main problems that currently exist regarding the responsibilities and role
of standby counsel.
1.

Vague Language of Rule 121(D)

The main problem created by the current formulation of Rule
121(D) is an interpretative one. Rule 121(D) is very short,212 but the
confusion created by the rule's words is great. The second sentence of
Rule 121(D) provides that "[s]tandby counsel shall attend the
proceedings and shall be available to the defendant for consultation and
advice."213 At issue in this sentence are the words "consultation" and
"advice," which under the current iteration of Rule 121(D) is the only
guidance provided to standby counsel regarding what actions the standby
counsel may and may not take.
2 14
According to Black's Law Dictionary,
there are two definitions of
"consultation" that are relevant to the discussion at bar: (1) "[t]he act of
asking the advice or opinion of someone (such as a lawyer)" and (2) "[a]
meeting in which parties consult or confer." 2 15 Both of these definitions
are rather cursory and do little to further an attorney's understanding of
what standby counsel is actually permitted to do. The only helpful
aspect of these two definitions is that the structure of the first definition
places the burden on the pro se defendant to actively ask the attorney
appointed as standby counsel for assistance with a particular matter.
Interestingly, the word "consultation" is defined in terms of the word

212. Including the section heading, Rule 12 1(D) is only thirty-five words. See PA. R.
CRIM. P. 121(D).
213. Id.
214. According to the Statutory Construction Act, "[w]ords and phrases shall be
construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved
usage[.]" 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1903 (2016). Moreover, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has stated that "a word's usage [generally] accords with its dictionary
definition." Commonwealth v. Giulian, 141 A.3d 1262, 1268 (2016).
215. Consultation,BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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"advice," which is the second vague word used in Rule 121(D) to define
the role of standby counsel.
"Advice," as defined by Black's Law Dictionary, refers to
"[g]uidance offered by one person, esp. a lawyer, to another; professional
counsel." 2 16 This definition, much like the definitions of "consultation,"

is perfunctory and lacks the specificity needed to truly inform an attorney
of how to fulfill the role of standby counsel. Within this definition of
"advice," the word "guidance" must be further defined. "Guidance" has
several definitions including "direction, advice or counseling, and
supervised care or assistance."2 17 These definitions do nothing to clarify
the realm in which standby counsel must operate.
Altogether, in the context of Rule 121(D), these definitions, at most,
provide that standby counsel must be available to meet with a pro se
defendant, offer his professional opinion when asked, and guide the pro
se defendant through the technicalities of his trial.
2.

Confusion and Meritless Claims

The aforementioned vague language of Rule 121(D) provides little
guidance to courts, attorneys appointed to act as standby counsel, and pro
se defendants. The language of Rule 121(D) allows judges the flexibility
to decide what "consultation" and "advice" mean in practice. 2 18 Some
Pennsylvania judges have taken a narrow view of standby counsel and
specifically prescribe what actions may and may not be taken by standby
counsel. 2 19 However, other Pennsylvania judges have taken a broad view
of standby counsel and allow standby counsel to undertake virtually any
task.220
As a result of the contradictory descriptions of the responsibilities
of standby counsel presently found in Pennsylvania case law, the role
that standby counsel plays at a pro se defendant's trial depends on where
the trial takes place, what judge presides over the trial, and the
disposition of that judge on that particular day.2 2 1 Even with the best of
research, pro se defendants in future Pennsylvania cases have no way of
216. Advice, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
217. Guidance, DICTIONARY.coM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/guidance?s
-t (last visited Feb. 14, 2017).
218. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 121(D) (lacking specific descriptions of "consultation" and
"advice").
219. See supra Part III.A.4 discussing Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63 (Pa. 2012)
and Part III.A.3 discussing Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 896 A.2d 508 (Pa. 2006).
220. See supra Part III.A.1 discussing Commonwealth v. Africa, 353 A.2d 855 (Pa.
1976) and Part III.A.2 discussing Commonwealth v. Brazil, 701 A.2d 216 (Pa. 1997).
221. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63 (Pa. 2012); Commonwealth v.
Fletcher, 896 A.2d 508 (Pa. 2006); Commonwealth v. Brazil, 701 A.2d 216 (Pa. 1997);
Commonwealth v. Africa, 353 A.2d 855 (Pa. 1976).
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knowing what can be expected of standby counsel. This disparity creates
a general state of uncertainty amongst pro se defendants in Pennsylvania.
As evidenced by the myriad cases discussed above, even after a trial
judge explains his view of standby counsel to a pro se defendant, those
pro se defendants remain confused about whether or not their standby
counsel has effectively discharged his or her duties.22 2 As a result, pro se
defendants consistently ask appellate courts to review their cases on the
grounds of ineffective assistance of standby counsel.223 Although
Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that ineffective assistance of
standby counsel claims are meritless, pro se defendants continue to bring
these claims, suggesting that pro se defendants do not fully understand
the role of standby counsel or what it means to proceed pro se.224 The
continued filing of these claims means that appellate courts must
needlessly address a claim that has been ruled meritless in Pennsylvania
for many decades, thereby decreasing the efficiency of Pennsylvania
appellate courts.
3.
Counsel

Ethical Issues for Attorneys Appointed to Act as Standby

While the above problems primarily revolve around the legal
implications for pro se defendants and the courts, the uncertain role of
standby counsel also raises ethical concerns for the attorneys appointed
to act as standby counsel.225 In much the same way that pro se
defendants will not be able to predict what role standby counsel may take
at trial, the same can be said of the attorneys appointed to act as standby
counsel. The current formulation of the law surrounding the role of
standby counsel prevents the attorneys appointed to act as standby
counsel from carefully examining the potential ethical concerns posed by
such an undertaking. Although a thorough analysis of the ethical
concerns surrounding standby counsel is beyond the scope of this
222. See supra Part III.A.1 discussing Commonwealth v. Africa, 353 A.2d 855 (Pa.
1976), Part III.A.2 discussing Commonwealth v. Brazil, 701 A.2d 216 (Pa. 1997), Part
III.A.3 discussing Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 896 A.2d 508 (Pa. 2006), and Part III.A.4
discussing Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63 (Pa. 2012).
223. See supra Part III.A.1 discussing Commonwealth v. Africa, 353 A.2d 855 (Pa.
1976), Part III.A.2 discussing Commonwealth v. Brazil, 701 A.2d 216 (Pa. 1997), Part
III.A.3 discussing Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 896 A.2d 508 (Pa. 2006), and Part III.A.4
discussing Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63 (Pa. 2012).
224. See supra Part III.A.1 discussing Commonwealth v. Africa, 353 A.2d 855 (Pa.
1976), Part III.A.2 discussing Commonwealth v. Brazil, 701 A.2d 216 (Pa. 1997), Part
III.A.3 discussing Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 896 A.2d 508 (Pa. 2006), and Part III.A.4
discussing Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63 (Pa. 2012).
225. See, e.g., Anne Bowen Poulin, Ethical Guidance for Standby Counsel in
Criminal Cases: A FarCry From Counsel?, 50 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 211, 217-45 (2013).

902

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:3

Comment, some of the major areas of concern include: whether an
attorney-client relationship exists, 22 6 whether the attorney-client privilege
applies, 22 7 and whether conflict of interest 228 rules apply.229
D.

A Solution to the Standby Counsel Problem: Revising Rule 121(D)

To address the problems discussed in Section C, the Pennsylvania
Criminal Rules Procedural Committee should revise Rule 121(D) and
define the role of standby counsel more thoroughly and in a manner more
consistent with current federal and Pennsylvania case law. Generally
speaking, this reform should include a specific list of duties that standby
counsel may undertake and a specific list of duties that standby counsel
may not undertake.
1.

Suggested Reform of Rule 121(D)

This proposed reform of Rule 121(D) would eliminate the second
half of the second sentence of the current rule and would instead include
two new subsections, which would prescribe the permissible and
impermissible actions of standby counsel. A third subsection would state
the remedies available to a pro se defendant if standby counsel does not
act in accordance with the new language.
In application, the proposed reform would be the following
italicized language:
(D) Standby Counsel. When the defendant's waiver of counsel is
accepted, standby counsel may be appointed for the defendant.
Standby counsel shall attend the proceedings.
(1) Permitted Conduct.
Standby counsel shall explain
courtroomprocedure and rules to the pro se defendant. Upon
request of the pro se defendant, standby counsel shall mark and
record exhibits admitted into evidence and explain relevant

226. See, e.g., ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 448
(2007) (stating that it is impossible for an attorney to provide true representation when a
defendant chooses to proceed pro se).
227. Compare, e.g., State v. Bebb, 740 P.2d 829, 834 (Wash. 1987) (holding that
attorney-client privilege protects discussions between a pro se defendant and standby
counsel), with Robinson v. Gunja, 92 F. App'x 624, 626-27 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding
that no privilege attached to inmate's phone calls to standby counsel because the prison
phones system did not provide for confidential communications and because the
defendant was "proceeding pro se, and thus not represented by counsel").
228. See ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 448 (2007)
(opining that counsel is not required to avoid conflicts of interest if the defendant has not
accepted an attorney-client relationship).
229. For an in-depth discussion of the ethical issues faced by attorneys appointed to
act as standby counsel see Poulin, supra note 225, at 217-45.
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legal concepts. Upon request of the pro se defendant, standby
counsel may give his or her opinion regardingtrialstrategy and
potential objections. Upon request of the pro se defendant or
upon instruction by the trial judge, standby counsel may
perform any other reasonable case-related actions as long as
those actions do not expressly or implicitly conflict with the
prohibitedconduct describedin subsection (2).
(2) Prohibited Conduct. Standby counsel shall not give an
opening or closing argument, speakfor or make arguments on
behalf of the pro se defendant, direct or cross examine
witnesses, make objections or motions during trial, prepare
written motions or documentsfor the pro se defendant, or speak
over the pro se defendant in the presence of the jury. Standby
counsel shall not communicate with the court outside the
presence or knowledge of the pro se defendant.
(3) Violation. The pro se defendant may not raisean ineffective
assistance of standby counsel claim. If standby counselfails to
appearat the proceeding orfails to undertake conduct required
by subsection (1), then the pro se defendant may petition the
court for a new trial or other appropriate relief If standby
counsel engages in conduct prohibited by subsection (2), then
the pro se defendant may raise a claim of error and the court
may grant relief appropriate in kind and degree to the
prohibitedconduct undertaken by standby counsel.
2.

Explanation of Why Reform Will Work

The proposed reform will protect the interests of pro se defendants
by helping to ensure that their Farettarights are not easily violated and
that the defendants maintain actual and apparent control of the trial, as
required by McKaskle.2 3 0 Moreover, "[t]he primary concern arising out
of appointment of standby counsel, is that appointed standby counsel
231
Thus, by
does too much[,] . . . not that counsel does too little."
reforming Rule 121(D) to include a list of prohibited conduct, courts can
better ensure that standby counsel will respect the rights guaranteed to
defendants by Farettaand McKaskle.
Additionally, the proposed reform will protect the interests of
standby counsel by clarifying the extent of standby counsel's obligations
and giving specific parameters within which standby counsel may
operate. This clarity will also alleviate some of the ethical concerns that
230. See supra Part II discussing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) and
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
231. Blackman v. McGrady, No. 12-5160, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184934, at *36
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2013).
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arise in the context of the pro se defendant-standby counsel relationship
by clarifying the parameters of that relationship.2 32 This proposed reform
of Rule 121(D) affords much deference to the requests made by the pro
se defendant to standby counsel. This proposed rule also expressly
prohibits conduct, such as cross-examining witnesses or giving a closing
argument, that by their very nature destroy the appearance of control by
the pro se defendant, which is crucial under McKaskle.23 3
Holistically, a reform of this type should decrease the number of
meritless ineffective assistance of standby counsel claims alleged by pro
se defendants. Additionally, a reform of this type would standardize the
appointment of standby counsel by trial judges across the state. When a
trial judge exercises his or her discretion and chooses to appoint standby
counsel, the trial judge can simply follow up the appointment by giving
an instruction to both standby counsel and the pro se defendant to
proceed as stated in the proposed reformed version of Rule 121(D). In
giving such an instruction, all standby counsel across the state of
Pennsylvania will be legally bound to act in-the same manner, which will
increase consistency and equality in the trials of pro se defendants.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The current state of the law regarding standby counsel in
Pennsylvania is complex and convoluted. It is clear (1) that a criminal
defendant has the constitutional right to self-representation 23 4 and (2) that
courts have discretion regarding whether to appoint standby counsel. 235
Beyond these two propositions, however, is a sphere of ambiguity,
confusion, meritless claims, and ethical pitfalls. 23 6
Under the current framework, courts in Pennsylvania delineate
competing and contradictory descriptions of the proper role of standby
counsel.237 As a result, pro se defendants are left not knowing whether
the actions undertaken by standby counsel are appropriate; thus, they
raise ineffective assistance of standby counsel claims.238 Nonetheless,
Pennsylvania courts have consistently found ineffective assistance of
standby counsel claims meritless.239

232.
standby
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See supra Part III.C.3 discussing ethical issues for attorneys appointed to act as
counsel.
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984).
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.C.2.
See supra Part III.B.
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Therefore, in order to address the disparity and uncertainty of the
proper role of standby counsel, the Pennsylvania Criminal Rules
Procedural Committee and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should
revise Rule 121(D) and thoroughly define the proper role of standby
counsel. 2 40 A detailed rule revision would enable pro se defendants,
attorneys appointed to act as standby counsel, and trial judges to better
understand what is expected of standby counsel, thereby increasing
judicial consistency across Pennsylvania.2 4

240.
241.

See supra Part III.D.
See supra Part III.D.2.

